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THE CYCLE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS:
TEXAS AS A CASE STUDY
Anthony Champagne and Kyle Cheek*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background on Judicial Elections
Unlike the federal model of judicial selection, the model for the
selection of state judges has undergone significant change through-
out American history.' Until the mid-1800s, state judicial selection
generally adhered to the federal model, emphasizing the appoint-
ment of judges. Typically, judges were selected by gubernatorial
appointment coupled with confirmation by a special commission or
the legislature; in some cases, judges were appointed directly by
the state legislature. 2 The emergence of Jacksonian egalitarian
democratic ideals in the nineteenth century brought about a grow-
ing belief that judges, like other public officials, should be account-
able to the voting public? As that ideal gained acceptance among
reformers, states began moving away from legislative and guberna-
torial appointment and toward the selection of judges by popular
election. In 1832, Mississippi became the first state to provide for
the selection of its judges by popular election. New York followed
in 1846. For the next sixty-five years, every new state to enter the
Union provided for some or all of its judges to be chosen by popu-
lar election.
* Anthony Champagne is a professor in the School of Social Sciences at the
University of Texas at Dallas. He specializes in law and public policy. Kyle Cheek is
an adjunct faculty member at Texas Christian University.
1. See MARY L. VOLCANSEK & JACQUELINE L. LAFON, JUDICIAL SELECTION:
THE CROSS-EvOLUTION OF FRENCH AND AMERICAN PRACTICES (1988) for a full
treatment of judicial selection practices in the United States.
2. PHILLIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT To BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE
QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 3 (1980).
3. Burton M. Atkins, Judicial Elections: What the Evidence Shows, 50 FLA. B. J.
152 (1976).
The concept of an elected judiciary emerged during the Jacksonian era as
part of a larger movement aimed at democratizing the political process in
America. It was spearheaded by reformers who contended that the concept
of an elitist judiciary ... did not square with the ideology of a government
under popular control.
Id.
4. DuBois, supra note 2.
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When popular judicial election began in Mississippi and New
York, judges typically ran on partisan ballots, campaigning along-
side their fellow party candidates. In the latter part of the nine-
teenth century, however, Progressive reformers grew increasingly
concerned with the influence of party bosses, who often gave judi-
cial nominations to the party faithful, instead of the most qualified
candidates.' To quell judicial selection by party leaders, reformers
pressed for nonpartisan judicial elections.6 In the closing decades
of the 1800s, the legal profession also responded to the extraordi-
nary influence of parties over judicial selection. Lawyers began or-
ganizing bar associations largely to promote judicial selection
based on qualifications rather than party patronage.7
In the mid-twentieth century, reformers began advocating the
"Missouri Plan," which removed the initial selection of judges from
popular control but retained the Jacksonian ideal of electoral ac-
countability.8 Under this plan, judges are appointed by a governor
from a list prepared by a judicial nominating committee. The
judges appointed under this plan then run in periodic, uncontested
"retention" elections where voters are allowed to determine
whether the judge remains in office. 9
Contested elections, however, have not been eliminated. Thirty-
nine states still select some judges through popular election, and
eleven states select their supreme court justices in partisan elec-
tions.'0 In spite of the Missouri Plan's initial popularity, the wave
of reform that accompanied its early years has waned. Judicial
elections are now the norm and their weaknesses require wholesale
reform. A clear understanding of judicial elections will shed light
on how to improve the process of selecting judges. This Article
focuses on Texas, whose history often foreshadows the experience
of other states.
5. Id. at 4.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. RICHARD A. WATSON & RONDAL G. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH
AND THE BAR: JUDICIAL SELECTION UNDER THE MISSOURI NONPARTISAN COURT
PLAN 7-9 (1969).
9. Id.
10. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS IN THE STATES: AP-
PELLATE AND GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS (2000), available at http://www.ajs.
org; Roy Schotland, Personal Views, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1361, 1362, 1365 (2001).
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B. The Case of Texas
In its first five years of statehood, Texas was a microcosm of the
early national experience with state judicial selection. Initially,
judges were appointed by the governor and approved by the Texas
senate." Then, in 1850, the influence of Jacksonian Democracy led
to the adoption of judicial selection by popular election. 12 Under
Reconstruction, Texas returned to the gubernatorial appointment
of judges. 13 However, largely in response to abuses of the guberna-
torial appointment power during Reconstruction, Texas included a
provision in its current constitution, adopted in 1876, for the selec-
tion of judges by popular election.'4 While the Texas constitution
does not require that judicial candidates run on partisan ballots,
Texas election law encourages judicial candidates to run as party
nominees.' 5
Although Texan judicial elections are conducted by partisan bal-
lot, the first 100 years of judicial elections reflected the dominance
of one party in Texas. Judicial races were seldom contested, and
when a contested race was run, incumbent judges were typically
secure.' 6 One study of judicial selection in Texas found that from
1952 through 1962, death, resignation, or retirement was more
likely to end judicial tenure than electoral defeat.'7 During the era
of one-party politics, contested elections seldom occurred in the
general election. Instead, challengers were more likely to appear
in the Democratic primary. Texas' provision for gubernatorial ap-
pointments to fill mid-term vacancies also became an important
means of ascending the bench. Mid-term resignation was common
among judges, allowing the governor to name a replacement. 18
Judges initially appointed by the governor then enjoyed the benefit
11. Anthony Champagne, The Selection and Retention of Judges in Texas, 40 Sw.
L.J. 53, 55 (1986).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 7.
15. Susan Douglass, Selection and Discipline of State Judges in Texas, 14 Hous. L.
REV. 672, 674 -75 (1977).
16. Bancroft Henderson & T.C. Sinclair, The Selection of Judges in Texas, 5 Hous.
L. REV. 430, 430-98 (1968).
17. Only 5% of all trial judges and 7% of appellate judges suffered electoral de-
feat between 1952 and 1962, while retirement or resignation accounted for 41% of all
changes in judicial office during that time. Id. at 441.
18. "Of all judges who served during the period 1940-1962, a total of 66 percent
were appointed. Just how meaningful appointments were is shown by reference to the
period 1952-1962 for which primary election statistics were available. In the first elec-
tion following appointment, 86.2 percent of the judges were unopposed and only 4
percent were defeated." Id. at 442.
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of incumbency when facing election for the first time.. This ar-
rangement was so common in the first 100 years of the 1876 consti-
tution that one study concluded that the Texas judicial selection
system was primarily appointive. 19
Only in the 1970s, with a newly emerged two-party political land-
scape, did meaningful contests for judicial election begin to occur.
Starting with district court races in urban areas, Republican candi-
dates began breaking the century-long Democratic stranglehold.20
As competitive partisan contests became more common, cam-
paigns standardized, with perhaps the most important develop-
ments being the new role of parties and the escalating cost of
judicial races.
II. CHANGE FROM OLD JUDICIAL POLITICS TO THE NEW
PLAINTIFF-DEFENSE WARS
As in other states that elect judges,2 judicial elections in Texas
were not always contested. 22 Traditionally, Texas justices, like most
elected officials in the state, were conservative Democrats. One
journalist aptly described the pre-1978 supreme court as follows:
[Jiustices' names seldom appeared in the press and were known
only to the legal community. Most justices had been judges in
the lower courts; a few had served in the Legislature. At elec-
tion time, sitting justices almost never drew opposition. Somejustices resigned before the end of their terms, enabling their
replacements to be named by the governor and to run as incum-
bents. In the event that an open seat was actually contested, the
decisive factor in the race was the State Bar poll, which was the
key to newspaper endorsements and the support of courthouse
politicians.
In effect, the legal and political establishment begat generations
of justices who reflected the assumption of their progenitors that
preservation of a "good bidness climate" is the highest aim of gov-
ernment. Part of that climate was a legal system in which oil com-
19. Id.
20. Champagne, supra note 11, at 53-117.
21. Election is a common method for selecting judges in the United States.
Thirty-nine states have some judicial elections. Of the nation's 1243 state appellate
judges, 47% are appointed for their initial terms, 40% face partisan elections, and
13% face nonpartisan elections. Of the nation's 8489 general jurisdiction state trial
judges, 24% are appointed for initial terms, 43% face partisan elections, and 33% face
nonpartisan elections. Schotland, supra note 10.
22. Roy Schotland, Statement of Roy A. Schotland before the Joint Select Commit-
tee on the Judiciary of the Texas Legislature Austin, Texas, March 25, 1988, 72 JUDICA-
TURE 154 (1988).
Y,.1
2002] CYCLE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 911
panies, hospitals, insurers, and other enterprises didn't have to live
in constant fear of lawsuits.
23
Judicial elections were sleepy, low-key affairs that resulted in the
election of pro-civil defense Democratic judges. This did not
change until the late 1970s. At that time, a remarkable event in the
history of the Texas judiciary occurred: an unknown lawyer named
Don Yarbrough ran for the Texas Supreme Court and won. Not
only was Yarbrough an unknown, but numerous ethical complaints
had been filed against him, and he ran against a highly respected
incumbent who had won the state bar poll by a 90% margin. Yar-
brough served only a few months before criminal charges and the
threat of legislative removal led to his resignation.
How did he win the election? Yarbrough was a well-known po-
litical name-in Texas, and voters probably confused him with either
the long-time U.S. senator, Ralph Yarborough, or with another
Don Yarbrough, who had twice run for governor.2 4 Regardless,
this episode proved that literally anyone could be elected to the
Texas Supreme Court, if they had a popular name. 5
Name identification might occur naturally, as with Yarbrough,
but it can also be bought. Around the same time Yarbrough
lucked into his judgeship, plaintiffs' lawyers began pouring signifi-
cant amounts of money into Texas Supreme Court campaigns in an
attempt to elect justices with pro-plaintiff philosophies. For exam-
ple, in 1982, a good election year for Democrats because popular
Democratic Senator Lloyd Bentsen headed the ticket, a highly suc-
cessful San Antonio plaintiffs' lawyer and one of his wealthiest and
most litigious clients, Clinton Manges, poured $350,000 into three
supreme court races; two of their candidates were elected. 6
23. Paul Burka, Heads, We Win, Tails, You Lose, TEX. MONTHLY, May 1987, at
138, 139.
24. Id.; Champagne, supra note 11, at 101. Prior to Yarbrough's election in 1976, a
state bar grievance committee had filed a disbarment suit against him alleging fifty-
three violations. Later, twenty more allegations were added. Tape recordings of Yar-
brough's plans to murder and mutilate enemies did not result in indictments, but Yar-
brough was indicted and convicted for aggravated perjury in reference to a forged
automobile title. Yarbrough eventually resigned from the court and gave up his law
license in 1977. This extraordinary story is told in Paul Holder, That's Yarbrough-
Spelled with One "0": A Study of Judicial Misbehavior in Texas, in PRAC. TEX. POL.
447-53 (Eugene Jones et al eds., 1980).
25. A similar situation occurred in 1978, when a little known plaintiffs' lawyer
named Robert Campbell made his try for the Texas Supreme Court, running against
an incumbent judge. The previous fall, University of Texas running back Earl Camp-
bell had won the Heisman Trophy. Burka, supra note 23, at 139.
26. Ken Case, Blind Justice, TEX. MONTHLY, May 1987, at 136, 138.
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By 1983, justices with significant backing from the-plaintiffs' bar
gained a majority on the Texas Supreme Court. 7 With the election
of a pro-plaintiffs' court, Texas tort law began moving in the plain-
tiffs' direction-a move that would damage the court's reputation.
In Manges v. Guerra, for example, a jury found that Clinton
Manges, acting as the manager of mineral leases on 70,000 acres of
the Guerra family's land, had violated his obligations to the Guer-
ras. The jury relieved Manges of his manager position and
awarded the Guerras $382,000 in actual damages and $500,000 in
exemplary damages.28 The intermediate appellate court upheld the
verdict, and appeal was taken to the Texas Supreme Court.29
Manges hired Pat Maloney, Sr. to represent him before the su-
preme court.
The case was assigned to Justice C.L. Ray, who had received sub-
stantial campaign contributions from Manges and Maloney. Ray
initially proposed an opinion supporting Manges. When the court
rejected that opinion, Ray tried again. Two justices eventually re-
cused themselves, one having been sued by Manges over a cam-
paign statement he had made, and the other having received
$100,000 in campaign money from Manges and Maloney. With
those recusals, the vote was 4-3 for Manges and for reversal of the
lower court. Then, the chief justice ruled that five votes were re-
quired for reversal. Justice Robertson, one of the justices who had
recused himself, immediately changed his recusal to a vote in favor
of reversal.3 ° The attorney for the Guerras filed a motion for a
rehearing and asked that Justices Kilgarlin, Robertson and Ray re-
cuse themselves.31 All three justices had received significant cam-
paign money from Manges and Maloney. This was only the
beginning of a major supreme court scandal.
In 1984, Justice Ray told a litigant that his case was a tough one
and that if he did not win that case, he would win the next.32 Jus-
tice Ray then discussed the court's deliberations and told the liti-
gant he would see what could be done back in Austin.
27. TEXANS FOR PUB. JUSTICE, PAYOLA JUSTICE: How TEXAS SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES RAISE MONEY FROM COURT LITIGANTS (1998), http://www.tpj.org/reports/
payola/intro.html.
28. Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984).
29. Id. at 181.
30. Id. at 185.
31. Motion for Recusal of Justice C.L. Ray, Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180
(Tex. 1983) (No. C-771); Motion for Recusal of Justices Ted Z. Robertson and William
W. Kilgarlin, Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1983) (No. C-771).
32. Eugene H. Methvin, Justice for Sale, READER'S DIG., May, 1998, at 131.
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Additionally, in 1985, at the request of Pat Maloney, Sr., Justice
Ray attempted to transfer two cases from one court of appeals to
another. Those scandals ultimately led to a public reprimand of
Justice Ray33 and the public admonition of Ray and another jus-
tice, William Kilgarlin.34
The prestige and integrity of the court continued to crumble.
Around the same time as the Justice Ray incidents, the court re-
fused to review an $11 billion judgment against Texaco, as large
campaign contributions flowed into the court's campaign coffers
from both Texaco lawyers and the plaintiff and plaintiffs'
attorneys.
Confronted with a crisis on the court, in 1986 Chief Justice John
Hill proposed merit selection of judges in Texas and offered him-
self as the leader of a movement for judicial reform.36 Rebellion
against Hill's leadership ensued, as did unprecedented intra-court
conflict.37 Fifteen months after proposing merit selection, and only
33. STATE COMM'N ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT, FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND PUBLIC
REPRIMAND RELATING TO CERTAIN ACTIVITIES OF JUSTICE C.L. RAY OF THE SU-
PREME COURT OF TEXAS (1987). Ray was disciplined for apparent favoritism in the
transfer of cases, for the improper receipt of air transportation, for the receipt and
consideration of ex parte communication, for the improper solicitation of funds, for
the ex parte disclosure of confidential information to a litigant, and for the initiation
of an ex parte private communication. Sadly, the timing of the release of the findings
was terrible, occurring when Ray was caring for his terminally ill daughter. Robert
Elder, Jr., Sanctions Spark More Feuding, TEX. LAW., June 15, 1987, at 17.
34. STATE COMM'N ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT, FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND PUBLIC
ADMONISHMENT RELATING TO CERTAIN ACTIVITIES OF JUSTICE WILLIAM KILGAR-
LIN OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS (1987). Two of Justice Kilgarlin's briefing
attorneys had accepted a weekend trip to San Antonio from Pat Maloney, Jr., a mem-
ber of a well-known plaintiffs' firm. Kilgarlin was admonished to "make certain in the
future that all staff working under him be required to observe the standards of fidelity
and diligence that apply to him." Kilgarlin was also "admonished that solicitation of
funds by a judge to prosecute a suit against a former attorney who had testified before
the House Committee is violative of the Code of Judicial Conduct." Interestingly,
Justice Kilgarlin blamed the sanction on the civil defense bar. Robert Elder wrote,
"Kilgarlin placed the blame for the sanctions on Larry Thompson, who in 1985
formed the Supreme Court Justice Committee. Thompson has said the group was set
up to counter the success of the plaintiffs' bar .... Kilgarlin called the pro-defense
committee '19 lawyers who hate my guts' and said 'one of the expressed purposes of
that group was to create a scandal involving me.'" Elder Jr., supra note 33, at 15.
35. "Lawyers representing Pennzoil contributed, from 1984 to early this year,
more than $355,000 to the nine Supreme Court justices sitting today. . . .Lawyers
representing Texaco have also been contributors, but they have given far less."
Thomas Petzinger, Jr. & Caleb Solomon, Texaco Case Spotlights Questions on Integ-
rity of the Courts in Texas, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 1987, at 1.
36. Anthony Champagne, Judicial Reform in Texas, 72 JUDICATURE 146, 152
(1988).
37. Id. at 151-52.
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half-way through his six year term, Hill resigned from the court.
His replacement, appointed by a Republican governor, was Tom
Phillips, a Houston trial judge and a Republican. When Hill used
Phillips' swearing-in ceremony to plead for merit selection of
judges, Justice Robert Campbell resigned, supposedly to campaign
against Hill's reforms.38
The result of the scandal and Hill's reform movement was not
only unprecedented conflict within the Texas Supreme Court, but
also an opening wedge for Republican penetration. By 1988, it was
time for a counter-attack by civil defense forces. For the 1988 elec-
tions, two-thirds of the Court's seats were vacant. Associate Jus-
tice Ted Z. Robertson chose to run against Phillips for the position
of chief justice.39 Justice Kilgarlin, admonished by the State Com-
mission on Judicial Conduct, was challenged by Nathan Hecht, a
Republican.40 Democratic incumbent Raul Gonzalez was chal-
lenged by Republican Charles Ben Howell. 41 A new appointee to
the court, Republican Barbara Culver, was challenged by Demo-
crat Jack Hightower. New appointee Republican Eugene Cook
was challenged by Democrat Karl Bayer. Finally, there was a bat-
tle over an open seat between Democrat Lloyd Doggett and Re-
publican Paul Murphy.42 It was the political equivalent of war
between plaintiffs' and civil defense interests.43
The twelve major candidates for the Texas Supreme Court raised
a total of $10,092,955. 44 A political action committee funded by
trial lawyers raised another $1.4 million for television commercials
and "get-out-the-vote" campaigns. Several of the races were
clearly split between candidates funded by plaintiffs' lawyers and
candidates funded by civil defense interests. That was especially
true of the race for chief justice where incumbent Phillips raised
slightly over $1 million and Robertson raised nearly $1.9 million.
Other heavily funded races between plaintiff- and civil defense-
backed candidates included the Kilgarlin-Hecht race where Kilgar-
lin raised over $2 million to Hecht's $650,000 and the Doggett-
38. Id. at 158.
39. Anthony Champagne, Campaign Contributions in Texas Supreme Court Races,
17 CRIM. L. & Soc. CHANGE 91, 95 (1992).
40. Id. at 98.
41. Id. at 97.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 95.
44. Id. at 99.
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Murphy race, where Doggett raised about $660,000 to Murphy's
$438,000.4 5
Angered by the pro-plaintiff tinge of the court's decisions, the
Texas Medical Association was heavily involved in the 1988 su-
preme court elections. Its political action committee gave over
$181,000 in direct contributions and encouraged individual doctors
to give at least $250,000 more.46
The great advantage of the Republican candidates was that they
could campaign against the plaintiff-backed candidates as reform-
ers bringing integrity back to the court. Indeed, Chief Justice Phil-
lips headed a bipartisan "clean slate" of candidates who were
opposed to incumbent Democrats backed by trial lawyers. 47 The
"reform" platform, together with financial backing of civil defense
interests and increasing Republican Party strength, led to the de-
feat of all the plaintiff-backed incumbents. The only pro-plaintiff
justice elected was Lloyd Doggett, a non-incumbent who had run
for an open seat. Democrat Raul Gonzalez won, but he was
backed by civil defense interests against a largely unfunded Repub-
lican. Democrat Hightower, a moderate, defeated an incumbent
Republican who had angered the Medical Association by opposing
medical malpractice caps. Republicans Phillips, Hecht and Cook
won, with Phillips and Hecht defeating the most heavily funded
plaintiff-backed Democrats. The result was the beginning of the
Republican domination of the court.48 Another effect was that
civil defense interests learned that they could beat heavily funded
plaintiff-backed candidates such as Kilgarlin and Robertson in
head-on battles. The election of 1988 was the beginning of the end
of the pro-plaintiff court of the 1980s.
The last gasp of the plaintiff-civil defense wars came in 1994
when pro-civil defense Democratic Justice Raul Gonzalez was up
for reelection. Gonzalez was challenged in the Democratic pri-
mary by Rene Haas, a trial lawyer financed by trial lawyers, in one
of the most vicious judicial campaigns in Texas history. Trial law-
yers made a clear effort to defeat a conservative Democrat who
strongly supported civil defense interests.49 The primary campaign
turned into the most expensive judicial race in history. Candidate
45. Id. at 97.
46. Id. at 99.
47. Id. at 94-96.
48. Id. at 96-99.
49. Wait Borges, Gonzalez-Haas Fight Pushes Others Aside, TEX. LAW., Mar. 14,
1994, at 1.
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expenditures totaled $4,490,000.50 Gonzalez won the run-off pri-
mary against Haas, causing the Republican candidate to withdraw
from the race, and effectively giving the office to Gonzalez.
After the Gonzalez-Haas race, trial lawyers no longer mounted
serious campaigns for the Texas Supreme Court because, no matter
how much they spent, their candidates lost. Some trial lawyer con-
tributions went to lower courts that seemed vulnerable to plaintiff-
backed campaigns, but the big battle over the Texas Supreme
Court was over. 1
Great plaintiff-defense battles for judicial positions are not
unique to Texas. Similar fights have occurred in other states such
as Alabama52 and Ohio.53 Indeed, some of the most common con-
flicts in judicial elections are between plaintiff and civil defense
interests.
A. Party Competition
Political parties play an important role in judicial elections.
Whether elections are partisan, nonpartisan, or retention elections,
political parties provide workers and funding. In fact, according to
the September 2000 campaign reports for the Alabama chief justice
race, the largest donor to the Democratic candidate for chief jus-
tice was the Democratic Party.54 The party label provides a signifi-
50. The Haas-Gonzalez primary election just barely holds the record for judicial
campaign expenditure. Roy Schotland, Financing Judicial Elections, 2000: Change
and Challenge 2001 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C. L. 1, 14 (forthcoming 2001).
51. The 1994 San Antonio Court of Appeals race was one of the earliest examples
of trial lawyers contributing substantially to court of appeals races. In that race, five
plaintiffs' firms kept the court from becoming Republican while Democrats were
badly beaten in other parts of the state. The five firms contributed over $366,000
directly and through their PACs, and they raised another $254,000 from other per-
sonal injury lawyers. Those five firms contributed nearly 37% of the Democratic can-
didates' total funds. All four Democratic incumbents for the San Antonio court of
appeals won, in contrast to the defeat of ten of the eleven Democratic incumbents
running for other courts of appeals in the state. Democrats running for the San
Antonio Court of Appeals raised twice as much money as the average candidate in a
Texas appellate race in 1994. Mark Ballard & Amy Boardman, 5 Firms Swung 4th
Court Races, TEX. LAW., Mar. 20, 1995, at 1.
52. Alabama has been described as "a battleground between businesses and those
who sue them." That battle, one scholar wrote, "is often fought in elections for the
Supreme Court of Alabama." Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Deci-
sions: A Case Study of Arbitration Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL. 645, 656-57 (1999).
53. Catherine Candisky, High Court Races, Once Dignified, Now Down, Dirty,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 1, 2000, at 1A.
54. Stan Bailey, Moore's War Chest Doubles Yates, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Sept. 26,
2000. A spokesman for the Alabama Citizens for a Sound Economy, a pro-business
organization, claims that trial lawyers will give about 2 million dollars to the State
Democratic Executive Committee and about 1 million of that sum will go to judges.
916
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cant political asset for candidates in low visibility judicial races.
Further, the party label is a crucial source of information for vot-
ers. As Professor Philip Dubois wrote:
[V]oters' reliance on the partisan label choices is, in a very real
sense, a rational act. This is no less true in judicial elections....
Thus, research has repeatedly demonstrated that where the par-
tisan cue is available, judicial voters will rely upon it. The avail-
ability of the party label both prompts voters to exercise a
choice, thereby increasing the percentage of the eligible electo-
rate participating in the election, and results in the expression in
the aggregate of the voters' preferences for the direction of judi-
cial policy.55
The party label provides insight into the attitudes and values of
judges and hints at how they will decide questions of public policy.
One recent analysis of 140 articles discussing the link between
party affiliation and performance on the bench confirmed that
"party is a dependable measure of ideology on modern American
courts."56 Nationally, party affiliation is not a uniform indicator of
judicial ideology. In a study of workers' compensation appeals de-
cided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court over a ten year period,
David Adamany found some correlation between the justices'
party affiliation and their votes with respect to claimants, but the
correlation was less than that found in Michigan." Adamany be-
lieves that differences in the partisanship of judicial campaigns, and
thus differences in the states' political cultures, explain the discrep-
ancies in the correlations. 8 Another study of partisan voting in
eight state courts reaches the following conclusions: "Where judges
are selected in highly partisan circumstances and depend upon a
highly partisan constituency for continuance in office, they may act
in ways which will cultivate support for that constituency, that is,
exhibit partisan voting tendencies in their judicial decision-
making." 59
See also Stan Bailey, Bench Hopefuls Get Lawyers' Donations, BIRMINCHAM NEWS,
Oct. 6, 2000.
55. Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence, and the Selection of State
Judges: The Role of Popular Judicial Elections, 40 Sw. L.J. 31, 44 (1986).
56. Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A
Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. Sys. J. 219, 243 (1999).
57. David W. Adamany, The Party Variable in Judges' Voting: Conceptual Notes
and a Case Study, 63 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 57 (1969).
58. Id.
59. DuBois, supra note 2, at 148.
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Of course, while partisan voting has its value, there is a down-
side. Highly qualified judicial candidates can be defeated simply
because they bear the wrong party label.60 After Republican
straight ticket voting led to the defeat of nineteen Democratic
judges in Harris County, Houston, Texas and Republican victories
in forty-one of forty-two contested judicial races, one law school
dean commented, "[I]f Bozo the Clown had been running as a Re-
publican against any Democrat, he would have had a chance. ' '6 1
Parties expect extreme loyalty from their judicial nominees. In
the 1970s, for example, when the Supreme Court of Michigan de-
cided a state redistricting case in favor of the Republican Party, the
Democratic chief justice was denied nomination for the 1976 elec-
tion.62 The state bar, however, rallied to support him, and he won
re-election as an independent. 63
Texas judges have long been expected to tow the party line. Two
Republican judges on an intermediate appellate court were re-
cently rebuked by delegates at the Republican State Convention
because of their decision to overturn a sodomy conviction, which
angered religious conservatives in the party.64 Although the judges
were Republicans, the delegates opposed their re-election and
placed language in the party platform attacking "activist judges
who use their power to usurp the will of the people. '65
Philip Dubois' highly regarded 1980 book, From Ballot to Bench,
is the classic defense of partisan elections and heralds the impor-
tance of party affiliation as an indication of judges' values. Dubois
excluded the South from his analysis because, at the time, the Re-
publican Party was insignificant in most Southern states and a
study of party competition there would have been futile. In recent
years, however, the Republican Party has shown such growth in the
South that partisanship has become especially important in the
study of Southern judicial elections.
60. Anthony Champagne, Political Parties and Judicial Elections, 34 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 1411 (2001).
61. Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: De-
ciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L.
REV. 760, 780 (1995).
62. Scott D. Wiener, Note, Popular Justice: State Judicial Elections and Procedural
Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 187, 196 (1996).
63. Id.
64. Julie Mason, Bizarre Double Standard Permeates State GOP Convention,
Hous. CHRON., June 25, 2000, at A32.
65. Right-Wing Attacks on Judicial Independence in the States in 2000, Right
Wing Watch Online (People for the American Way), Sept. 25, 2000, at www.pfaw.org.
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Voters can best use party affiliation as a predictor of the atti-
tudes and values of judges in appellate court elections. It is in ap-
pellate courts that major policy questions are decided, not in trial
courts, where more routine legal issues are handled.
Texas, like many Southern states, was once a one-party state.
Real electoral competition in judicial races was found only in Dem-
ocratic primaries, and there was little competition in those prima-
ries when a candidate had the political advantage of incumbency.66
In 1978, however, Bill Clements, the first Republican elected gov-
ernor since the end of Reconstruction, was elected. He began ap-
pointing Republicans to open and new judicial seats, giving
Republicans the advantage of incumbency.67 The Republican
Party began to rapidly gain strength, possibly due to Ronald Rea-
gan's enormous popularity. In 1984 in particular, Ronald Reagan
was so popular in Texas that he garnered nearly 64% of the two-
party vote for President. His strength affected races far down the
ballot, including those for the major trial courts in Texas. That
year, Democrats challenged four Republican incumbents; all four
Republican incumbents won. In contrast, there were sixteen races
where Democratic incumbents were challenged by Republicans,
and only three of the Democratic incumbents won.68 A Demo-
cratic nominee was no longer guaranteed election. Indeed, in some
counties (initially Dallas), the Republican Party gained such
strength in the early 1980s that there was a massive movement of
trial court judges from the Democratic to the Republican Party.69
Soon, the only Democrat who could win election to Dallas County
66. Of the seventeen states with partisan judicial elections, five are Southern. Un-
til twenty to thirty years ago all five were one-party Democratic states. The states
with partisan judicial elections are Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Lou-
isiana, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Texas and West Virginia. Michigan, Ohio, and Idaho, however, should be added to
that list. While these three states have a non-partisan ballot, judicial candidates run as
partisan candidates. The five Southern states on this list that were once one-party
Democratic states are Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Texas.
Champagne, supra note 60, at 1415 n.16.
67. Many of those early Republican appointees were defeated in their first bid for
reelection after being appointed by Governor Clements. In 1982, a strong Demo-
cratic year in Texas, every one of the twenty-three incumbent judges who was de-
feated was a Clements appointee facing his first election after appointment.
Champagne, supra note 11, at 66.
68. L. Douglas Kiel, Carole Funk & Anthony Champagne, Two-Party Competition
and Trial Court Elections in Texas, 77 JUDICATURE 290, 291 (1994).
69. Champagne, supra note 11 at 79.
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trial courts was Ron Chapman, a judge who shared the same name
as the most popular radio disk jockey in the area.7°
The Republican onslaught in statewide elections mounted more
slowly but was just as overwhelming. None of the eighteen judges
elected statewide in Texas is a Democrat, and in the 2000 elections,
no Democrat ran for any of the three open seats on the Texas Su-
preme Court. There are, of course, some counties and regions in
Texas-the Rio Grande Valley, for example-where Democrats
are successful. However, the move from one-party Democratic
dominance to substantial one-party Republican dominance was
rapid, taking less then twenty years.
B. Interest Group Politics
Interest groups play a significant role in judicial elections. They
provide potential judges with the funding needed to reach voters
and assist candidates in mobilizing voters. Interest groups also pro-
vide voters with important cues about the attitudes and values of
judicial candidates in states where the parties are not heavily in-
volved in judicial elections. For example, in a recent superior court
race in California, one candidate obtained the endorsements of the
Sacramento County Deputy Sheriff's Association and the Sacra-
mento Police Officers' Association.7 1 If a voter did not know that
the candidate had been a police officer and a prosecutor, such en-
dorsements would provide a hint that the candidate was pro-law
enforcement.
Interest group involvement in judicial elections has changed in
several ways. Interest groups are increasingly national in scope,
and the number of groups and the amount of money they contrib-
ute have vastly increased. In 1968, there were 10,300 interest
groups; in 1988, 20,600.72 During World War II there were 500 reg-
istered lobbyists in Washington; today there are 25,000.7 3 The
number of political action committees registered with the federal
government grew from 608 in 1974 to about 4000 in 1994.74 As
judicial races become increasingly competitive, campaign costs rise
70. Anthony Champagne & Greg Thielemann, Awareness of Trial Court Judges,
74 JUDICATURE 271, 272 (1991).
71. Gary Delsohn, Spending, Integrity Hot Issues in Judge Race, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Sept. 10, 2000, at B1.
72. G. Calvin MacKenzie, The Revolution Nobody Wanted, N.Y. TIMES (Literary
Supplement), Oct. 13, 2000, at 12.
73. Id.
74. JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY 22, 24 (Longman 1997)
(1989); MacKenzie, supra note 72.
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dramatically. Judicial candidates now need the substantial re-
sources of interest groups to win elections.
For some analysts, interest group involvement in judicial politics
is more than unhealthy; it challenges the appearance of judicial im-
partiality. Some analysts go further and suggest that judges are be-
coming "captives" of influential interest groups.75
In Texas, as elsewhere, 76 most interest group involvement in ju-
dicial races involves economic as opposed to ideological interests.
Traditionally, the main interest groups in judicial elections are the
competing plaintiff and civil defense segments of the bar. In states
where unions are powerful, unions will often align with plaintiffs'
lawyers in backing pro-plaintiff judicial candidates.77 In Texas,
plaintiffs' lawyers provide the main support for plaintiff-oriented
judges due to the comparative weakness of unions. Civil defense
lawyers and firms are aligned with business and professional inter-
ests. One of the main reasons for the success of Republicans and
moderate-to-conservative Democrats in the 1988 Texas Supreme
Court elections was the strong involvement of the Texas Medical
Association (TMA). Not only did the TMA contribute substantial
sums of money to its slate of candidates, but it also encouraged
individual doctors to contribute money. The Association created a
grass-roots campaign through which Texas physicians actively cam-
paigned for the TMA slate.78
75. NORTHEAST OHIO AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., OHIO SUPREME COURT JUS-
TICE FOR SALE (2000), www.afsc.net; see also TEXANS FOR PUB. JUSTICE, supra note
27.
76. One recent study of judicial elections in Pennsylvania strongly suggests that
economic interests overwhelmingly dominate financial contributions to judicial races.
Of the $3,129,783 contributed by PACs and law firms to thirty-five Pennsylvania su-
preme court candidates from 1979 to 1997, only eighteen contributing groups were
labeled "ideological," and they contributed only $25,053. In contrast, groups catego-
rized as "business" groups gave $2.5 million and consisted of 290 PACs and law firms.
Four hundred labor PACs gave about $527,000. James Eisenstein, Financing Penn-
sylvania's Supreme Court Candidates, 84 JUDICATURE 10, 17 (2000).
77. One newspaper article described the political battle lines in judicial elections
as follows:
This ugly transformation of judicial politics has come as some of the nation's
most divisive disputes have come before the courts. State Supreme Courts
now decide the future of school funding; policies affecting guns, tobacco and
the environment; and the rules that make it easy, or difficult, to sue corpora-
tions and doctors for damages. With such enormous stakes, the battle lines
are stark: Trial lawyers and unions seek judges who will side with individuals
and embrace new legal theories. Businesses want judges who'll protect them
and the status quo.
Campaign Contributions Corrupt Judicial Races, USA TODAY, Sept. 1, 2000, at 16A.
78. Champagne, supra note 39, at 99.
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One study of seven Texas Supreme Court Justices' campaign
contributions provided a good indication of the campaign contribu-
tions of interest groups with economic concerns. That study found
that the political action committees and executives of fifty corpora-
tions contributed 15% of the money raised by the seven justices.
The study also found that the family of the head of a major tort
reform group gave $60,000 to the justices and that 9% of the jus-
tices' money came from the political action committees of thirty
trade groups, including the Texas Society of CPAs, the Texas Medi-
cal Association, the Texas Association of Realtors, the Texas Asso-
ciation of Defense Counsel, and the Texas Restaurant
Association.79
In 1995, the TMA's involvement in Texas Supreme Court races
created a major ethical issue for the court. Dr. Bernard Bradley
had a large malpractice judgment awarded against him which the
TMA found grossly unfair. Dr. Bradley became the catalystic fac-
tor needed to encourage physicians to actively participate in judi-
cial races and back TMA-endorsed candidates. The Texas Medical
Association produced a videotape about the Bradley case and used
it to encourage doctors to back its candidates for the court. Ulti-
mately, the Bradley case came before the Texas Supreme Court
and one of the issues considered was whether justices who ap-
peared in the videotape and who were endorsed by the TMA
should recuse themselves from hearing the case. One justice, who
did not appear in the videotape, recused himself in disgust over the
inappropriateness of the TMA's deep involvement in the judicial
election and its emphasis on reversing the verdict against Dr. Brad-
ley.80 His protest, however, was to no avail. The remaining eight
justices participated in the decision and reversed the Bradley ver-
79. TEXANS FOR PUB. JUSTICE, supra note 27.
80. Justice Bob Gammage recused himself. He wrote:
The problem is the perception created by a nineteen-minute video produced
by TEX-PAC, the political action committee of the Texas Medical Associa-
tion. A parody of Star Wars entitled Court Wars III, the video was intended
to garner support for TEX-PAC's favored candidates for the Texas Supreme
Court in the 1992 general election. By analogizing the Texas Trial Lawyer's
Association to Darth Vader's evil empire and a "bipartisan coalition of
medicine, business, agriculture and industry" to the champions of "fairness,
impartiality and reform," the video sought to persuade viewers that the elec-
tion of certain candidates to the Texas Supreme Court was important in their
professional and personal lives. The video urged physicians not only to con-
tribute money, but also to "conduct grass roots efforts ... from ... slate
cards to office displays, voter information materials and handouts, to sample
letters to communicate with your patients, colleagues and friends, to signa-
ture-styled newspaper ads ....
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dict. One even wrote a reply to the justice's recusal in which he
tried to justify the participation of those justices who had appeared
in the videotape.8'
Texas has had more than its share of troublesome cases where
interest groups have appeared to compromise the independence of
judges. For example, in Houston, Texas, victims' rights groups
have frequently aligned with prosecuting attorneys to elect judges
who are tough on crime. Thus, judges, well aware that their politi-
cal futures may hang on their image as law and order judges, some-
times appear to pander to the crime control interests. One judge,
for example, taped a picture of Judge Roy Bean's hanging saloon
on the front of his bench, superimposed his image over Judge
Bean's, and referred to the high court judges as "liberal bastards"
and "idiots."82
In an effort to drive home the importance of the Court races, the video
goes beyond general statements to focus on the consequences of one particu-
lar medical malpractice case. Pointing to this case, the narrator alleges that
"[ain unjust legal system that punishes the innocent, along with the guilty,
still flourishes in Texas, and medicine will always be a prime target." The
defendant doctor is described as being "faced with bankruptcy, all for com-
ing to the rescue of a patient in desperate need of his help." This "tragic
situation" is called "a classic exercise in Texas justice where no good deed
goes unpunished." Although a similar situation could "happen anytime in
any place," the doctor is not without hope, as "[he] has a Supreme Court he
can appeal to, if we prevail in November. Without that, he would have no
chance, and his career would be ruined as a practicing physician .. "
I believe that (1) where a person or entity has sought to engender support,
financial or otherwise, for a judicial candidate or group of candidates, and
(2) where that effort is made through a medium which is intended to be
widely circulated, and (3) where that effort ties the success of the person's or
entity's chosen candidate or candidates to the probable result in a pending
or impending case, a judge should recuse from participation in that case ......
Rogers v. Bradley, 909 S.W.2d 872, 873-74 (Tex. 1995).
81. Justice Craig Enoch wrote:
... I am not critical of those who raise money for and campaign on behalf of
judicial candidates. Those parties should be commended for their involve-
ment in the political process. The vice lies rather in the Texas judicial selec-
tion system, which places intolerable tensions between the process by which
judges are chosen and the obligations they must discharge once in office....
To establish recusal as proper under the facts of this case would seriously
jeopardize their ability to perform the duties of their office. For candidates
and their supporters alike, the fine line of conducting a campaign which
draws public interest and attention without eroding public confidence in ju-
dicial neutrality is hard to hew.
Id. at 884.
82. Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: De-
ciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L.
REV. 760, 813 (1995).
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C. The Role of Money
Judicial elections, especially competitive ones, require a great
deal of money. The 1980 judicial campaign was the first million
dollar campaign in Texas and was primarily self-funded by individ-
ual judicial candidates.83 In 1984, Texas had its first million-dollar
campaign that was not self-funded, and for several years afterward,
million-dollar campaigns were fairly commonplace. 4 Table 185
provides data on campaign contributions in competitive Texas Su-
preme Court races from 1980 to 1998. It shows that on average,
candidates needed considerably more than $1 million to win elec-
tion from 1984 to 1996. Indeed, even the average campaign trea-
sury of Democratic and Republican candidates generally totaled
more than $1 million during that time.
Campaign expenses generally dropped for most candidates in
the 1996 election cycle, and further dropped in 1998. In the 2000
elections,86 no Democrat opposed any of the three incumbent
Republicans running in Texas Supreme Court elections. One in-
cumbent spent less than $100,000 on her campaign. She had no
primary opponent and her only opponent in the general election
was a Libertarian candidate who spent nothing. Another incum-
bent spent nearly $320,000. He had token opposition in the Re-
publican primary and opposition in the general election from a
Libertarian and a Green Party candidate, both of whom spent
nothing. The third Republican incumbent was the first Latino to
run for the Texas Supreme Court in a Republican primary. Per-
haps due to the uncertainty inherent in being the first Latino, he
spent nearly $800,000. His primary opponent spent less than
83. The wealthy candidate in the 1980 campaign was Will Garwood. He had been
appointed to the Texas Supreme Court by Republican Governor Bill Clements and
ran as the Republican nominee against C.L. Ray, a Democrat and intermediate appel-
late judge who received substantial trial lawyer backing.
84. John Hill, a former Texas secretary of state, former attorney general, and un-
successful Democratic candidate for the governorship in 1978 (defeated by Republi-
can Bill Clements), successfully ran for the chief justiceship in 1984 with a campaign
treasury of over $1.4 million. His Republican opponent, John Bates, was not well
known and had only about $12,000 in contributions. Bates was able, however, to gar-
ner about 46% of the vote, probably because he ran as a Republican with Ronald
Reagan at the top of the ticket. Champagne, supra note 11, at 91.
85. Kyle Cheek & Anthony Champagne, Money in Texas Supreme Court elections:
1980-1998, 84 JUDICATURE 20, 22 (July/Aug. 2000) (The data in this article has been
readjusted from 1998 to 2001 dollars).
86. Expenditures reported for the 2000 election are in 2000 dollars (unadjusted for
inflation). Schotland, supra note 50, at 30.
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$5,000, and a Libertarian general election opponent spent
nothing. 7
As the days of real competition in statewide races came to an
end, so did the days of big money Texas Supreme Court elections.
Still, substantial campaign funds remain, perhaps because of occa-
sional competition in Republican primaries. Further, the mere ex-
istence of campaign funds wards off opposition and provides
protection for the incumbent against surprise electoral attack. In
Texas, an incumbent Republican running for re-election for the su-
preme court has many potential donors who are more than willing
to give to the candidate viewed as an obvious winner.
In the 1980s, plaintiff-oriented Democrats running for the Texas
Supreme Court received their funding predominantly from trial
lawyers. Today, civil defense-oriented judges get their money from
civil defense interests. One study of campaign funding for seven
civil defense-oriented justices from 1994 to 1997 found that 42% of
the $9.2 million raised by these justices came from parties and law-
yers with cases before the court, or who were at least "closely
linked" to such cases. Political action committees and executives of
fifty corporations gave another 15%, and 9% of the money came
from thirty trade groups. The sources of the remaining funds were
not identified.88 Clearly, substantial funds come from those with
interests in the outcome of litigation before the court.
Negative publicity for the court (related to the large amount of
campaign money raised for supreme court elections; the Texaco-
Pennzoil case; the campaign contributions associated with that
case; and the scandal involving Justice C.L. Ray) has led to major
campaign fund-raising reform. Reform came in the form of the
1995 Judicial Campaign Finance Act, 9 which sets up contribution
limits for judicial candidates. The limits are quite generous and
vary from one court level to another. For the Texas Supreme
Court, campaign contributions are limited to $5,000 from an indi-
vidual per election. 90 One may argue that the law has been effec-
tive in that single lawyers or small groups of lawyers no longer
provide almost all of a judicial candidate's funding, as was occa-
sionally true in the 1980s. Such funding, however, came from a
handful of wealthy plaintiffs' lawyers, supporting Democratic can-
87. Gonzales won the primary by a huge margin of 59%. Still, his primary victory
margin was less than the other incumbent Republican who had a primary opponent.
88. TEXANS FOR PUB. JUSTICE, supra note 27.
89. Id.
90. TEX. ELEC. CODE § 253.155 (1999)
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didates. As Texas became Republican that funding dried up. Now
the money comes from large civil defense firms, businesses, and
trade groups, where funding is more dispersed.
Occasionally, substantial sums are still spent on lower court
races. For example, in 2000, an incumbent Democrat on the first
court of appeals spent nearly $681,000 and lost the general elec-
tion. In Harris County (Houston), one trial court election saw over
$918,000 spent despite no opposition in the general election. All
the money was spent in the Republican primary and primary run-
off election, the incumbent Republican spending $633,000 of that
sum.91 In other words, as campaign funds and spending drop for
Texas Supreme Court races, some appellate and trial court races
are getting more expensive.
III. THE CONTINUING (AND LARGELY IGNORED) PROBLEMS
A. The Name Game
Judicial campaigns can be expensive and hard fought, but they
remain low-visibility races where voters are often unfamiliar with
the candidates. Unfamiliarity makes a party label all the more im-
portant. If a contested office has low visibility, voters will often use
the party affiliations of the candidates as a cue to the candidates'
values and vote accordingly.
Of course, in party primaries all candidates for an office have the
same party affiliation, so party label is not a voting cue. And in
general elections, some voters will rely more on name recognition
than party label in casting their ballots.92 One reason yard signs
are commonly used by judicial candidates is that they are an inex-
pensive advertising mechanism. Of course, the yard sign rarely
states more than the candidate's name and potential office, but it
helps make the judicial candidate's name a familiar one.
Perhaps the most famous instance of name familiarity (and voter
name confusion) was the election of Don Yarbrough to the Texas
Supreme Court.93 But there have been numerous other instances
of name familiarity assisting candidates. In recent years, a number
of judges were elected with names that have considerable appeal to
91. Schotland, supra note 50, at 30.
92. Texas political strategist George Christian said the following with respect to
the name identification issue: "People don't pay much attention to Supreme Court
races. All they pay attention to in Supreme Court races is a name." Virginia Ellis,
Familiar Names, Big Money Win High Court Races, DALLAS TIMES HERALD, May 5,
1986, at 8A.
93. Supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
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Texas voters, such as Sam Houston Clinton, Ira Sam Houston, John
Marshall, and Sam Bass. Former Texas Supreme Court Chief Jus-
tice Joe Greenhill believes that he gained votes in Dallas because
of the well-known Greenhill School, though he had no connection
with it. Former Chief Justice Robert Calvert believes that he bene-
fited from having the same name as the long-time state comptrol-
ler, whose name appeared on all state warrants. He also thinks
that he benefited from an advertising campaign for Calvert's Whis-
key that was in use during one of his election campaigns. The
newspaper ad campaign read "Switch to Calvert."94
One study of Dallas County voters' recognition of the names of
Texan political figures found high recognition for U.S. Senator
Lloyd Bentsen and Dallas Mayor Annette Strauss. Texas Supreme
Court Justice Raul Gonzalez had moderately high name recogni-
tion, as did a trial court judge involved in a case with such a high
profile that it became the subject of a movie.95 Another trial court
judge, with moderately high name recognition, was the subject of a
nationwide controversy over remarks he made about gay murder
victims. But one trial court judge, Ron Chapman, had name recog-
nition almost as high as Senator Bentsen's and Mayor Strauss'.
When voters were asked to recall the "public office" that Ron
Chapman held, the overwhelming response was "disk jockey."
Judge Ron Chapman shared the same name as the most popular
radio personality in Dallas County. The voter recognition that he
got from that name probably explained why Chapman was the last
Democrat in Dallas County to win election to trial court.96
Selection based on name recognition is a potential problem in
judicial races because judicial candidates have low visibility and are
not near the top of the ticket. Some states are enhancing voter
awareness of judicial candidates by providing voter information
pamphlets containing basic background information on the candi-
dates. Indeed, studies have found that voters tend to use voter in-
formation pamphlets as their main source of information about
judicial candidates. 97 Texas, however, provides no voter informa-
tion pamphlets to its voters despite efforts to pass legislation re-
94. Champagne, supra note 11 at 100-102.
95. Anthony Champagne & Greg Thielemann, Awareness of Trial Court Judges,
74 JUDICATURE 271, 272 (1991) (Judge Larry Baraka, a Republican who ran unop-
posed for a second term in 1988, figured prominently in publicity about the release of
Randall Dale Adams. The movie "The Thin Blue Line" is about Adams.).
96. Id. at 274
97. Thomas R. Phillips, State of the Judiciary 77th Legislature (Feb. 13, 2001), app.
E, http://www.tomphillips.com. The appendix is a report by Charles H. Sheldon and
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quiring it to do so. Cost is the concern. Two years ago, when it
became clear that cost considerations would prevent voter infor-
mation pamphlets in Texas, legislation was passed to provide candi-
date information over the Internet, since Internet pamphlets would
be essentially cost-free. That legislation, however, was vetoed by
then Governor George W. Bush, who indicated that he did not be-
lieve the government should provide candidate information to
voters. 98
B. Minority Representation
Only about 8% of Texas judges are Latino, and less than 3% are
African-American. 99 In contrast, 12% of Texas' population is Afri-
can-American and 29% is Latino.100 These low numbers invite sev-
eral interpretations. One is that white voters dominate counties
and larger judicial districts and vote against minority judicial candi-
dates. Civil rights organizations representing Latino and African-
Americans have argued that in order for minorities to get elected
to office, smaller judicial districts must be cut so that minority vot-
ers may comprise a majority. 01 Alternatively, it is argued that mi-
nority candidates, like minority voters, tend to be Democrats at a
time when Republicans increasingly win Texan judicial races.
Thus, it is party affiliation, not race or ethnicity, that prevents mi-
Nicholas P. Lovrich entitled Preliminary Report on Judicial Voters in King and Spo-
kane County 1996 Judicial Elections.
98. Steve Brewer & Kathy Walt, Bush Vetoes Public-Defense Bill, Oks Health-
Care Fee Negotiations, HOUSTON CHRON., June 22, 1999, § 1, at 1. A little-noticed bill
passed the Texas legislature that could have greatly affect name-game judicial politics.
The bill required that candidates for the two statewide elected courts, the Texas Su-
preme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals (the highest court in Texas for crimi-
nal cases), submit the signatures of 500 registered voters with at least 100 signatures
coming from each of five senatorial districts along with a $3,000 filing fee to get a
candidate's name on the party primary election ballot. The bill's sponsor hoped that
this would require people to have rather broad support in order to run for the state's
two highest courts. Thus, a candidate could not run because, in the words of the bill's
sponsor, "they have a happy name." Mary Alice Robbins, Special Report: Legislative
Review 2001, TEX. LAW., June 4, 2001, at 19. However, the bill was vetoed by Gover-
nor Rick Perry.
99. Thomas R. Phillips, State of the Judiciary 76th Legislature, March 29, 1999,
http://www.altonline.com/clients/chief/state.htm.
100. BENJAMIN GINSBERG ET AL., WE THE PEOPLE: AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERI-
CAN POLITICS 808 (3d ed., Texas ed. 2001).
101. The president of an African-American bar organization in Dallas County, for
example, claimed that countywide judicial elections impede the ability of African-
Americans to get elected to judgeships. Christy Hoppe & Lori Stahl, New Plan for
Electing State's Judges Sought Democrats, Minorities Who are Upset with Ruling Vow
to Fashion Strategy, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 20, 1994, at 23A.
CYCLE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
norities from being elected to judgeships.0 2 It is also argued that
there are few minority judges because there are few minority law-
yers (with the exception of justices of the peace and county judges,
Texas judges must be lawyers). °3
Low minority representation has elicited federal litigation, but in
1993 the Fifth Circuit held that party affiliation, not minority sta-
tus, explained the low number of minority judicial candidates. 10 4
As a result, civil rights lawyers failed in their efforts to reduce the
size of Texas judicial districts.
IV. THE FAILURE OF JUDICIAL REFORM
For fifty years reformers have discussed the need to change the
way Texas selects its judges, but little has changed. Many interests
play a part in the selection of judges, and thus far it has been im-
possible to put together a coalition of interests strong enough to
spark change. The political parties, for example, have a strong in-
terest in the way judges are selected since judicial offices are offices
that party activists seek, and are only available under a party label.
A nonpartisan system of selecting judges, such as a merit selection
or appointive system, would reduce the political parties' role in the
process. Given its current dominance, the Texas Republican Party
is not going to give up or reduce its role in selecting judges.0 5
Incumbent judges are also interested in the selection of judges,
and they too are satisfied with the present system. After all, it got
them into office. An alternative system may not work so well. In-
cumbents know they can succeed in a partisan election system, but
success is less clear under an alternative. °6
Civil rights groups argue that to elect more minority judges you
must have smaller districts. But this would reduce Republican
Party strength and is therefore resisted. The Republican Party suc-
102. Bob Driegert, chairman of the Dallas County Republican Party, argued that
minorities win judicial elections when they run as Republicans. He also argued that
countywide elections are beneficial to the Republican Party in Dallas County since
the Republican Party is the majority party there. With countywide elections, the
Republicans can win all offices; with smaller districts, Republicans, he argued, cannot
sweep county elections. The issue of countywide vs. smaller judicial districts, he ar-
gued, is "more of a partisan issue than a minority-equity issue." Id. at 27A.
103. League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 865-
66 (5th Cir. 1993).
104. Id. at 859.
105. Anthony Champagne, Judicial Selection in Texas: Democracy's Deadlock, in
TEXAS POLITIcs: A READER 88, 95-96, 101 (Anthony Champagne & Edward J. Harp-
ham eds., 2d ed. 1998).
106. Id. at 98.
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ceeds county-wide, but will have greater difficulty securing smaller,
minority districts. Among minority interests, there is dispute over
how small judicial districts should be. African-American leaders
would prefer to elect judges in places like Harris (Houston) and
Dallas Counties in county commissioners precincts, which would
create an African-American dominated district in 25% of the
county. But such division does nothing for Latino interests, which
would need considerably smaller districts to constitute a major-
ity.1"7 The business community has felt uncomfortable with very
small districts, fearing that they will lead to the election of pro-
plaintiff judges in some areas. °8
Similarly, there is concern that a move to an appointive system
would vastly increase the power of the governor. Not only is a
strong governor contrary to Texas political tradition, but a strong
governor today will increase the power of a conservative, Republi-
can chief executive. Therefore a change to an appointive system
will not sit well with many Democrats and trial lawyers. 10 9
The number and diversity of interests concerned with judicial se-
lection has prevented change. A change inducing coalition must be
especially strong, because most changes will require a constitu-
tional amendment. An amendment requires strong legislative sup-
port, as well as sufficient popular support to carry a majority in a
state-wide election. It is unlikely, therefore, that the Texas system
of judicial selection will change. There has been major scandal;
civil rights litigation; turnover in the power of the political parties;
outrageous special interest contributions; resignation of supreme
court justices (including the chief justice); and one reform proposal
after another; yet change has not occurred, and, it seems reasona-
ble to conclude, is unlikely to occur. Like the Judicial Campaign
Finance Act-the only major reform in the selection of Texas
judges-change must come from within the current system of parti-
san election.
V. TEXAS JUDICIAL POLITICS Now AND ITS LESSONS FOR
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS ELSEWHERE
A. The Effects of New Judicial Politics
One of the chief criticisms leveled against the popular election of
judges is that the integrity of courts suffers when judicial candi-
107. Id. at 97-98, 101, 103.
108. Id. at 99.
109. Id. at 95-96.
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dates are forced to engage in campaign politics.'10 That criticism
predates the American experience with judicial selection. Edmund
Burke offered the following observation on an elected judiciary in
his commentary on the French Revolution:
[E]lective, temporary, local judges . . . exercising their depen-
dent functions in a narrow society, must be the worst of all tribu-
nals. In them it will be vain to look for any appearance of
justice towards strangers, towards the obnoxious rich, towards
the minority of routed parties, towards all those who in the elec-
tion have supported unsuccessful candidates. It will be impossi-
ble to keep the new tribunals clear of the worst spirit of
faction."'
The experience with elected state judiciaries has not been as dire
as Burke predicted. However, the chief concerns remain the same
in Texas as elsewhere: elected judges are overly responsive to elec-
toral pressures;"12 they do not administer justice impartially; and
public confidence in the judiciary's legitimacy suffers as a result.
The integrity of the courts is heightened when judges are perceived
as impartial and not beholden to interests whose cases they may be
called upon to hear.113
Given the potential for electoral politics to create the appear-
ance of undue influence on judicial decisions, it is not surprising
that one of the chief effects of the new judicial politics in Texas has
been heightened media attention with respect to the state judiciary.
As judicial elections have become high profile, media coverage has
also increased, and scrutiny has become more intense."' On De-
cember 6, 1987, that scrutiny landed Texas' judicial elections in the
national spotlight. Texas was shaken when the national television
110. See WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 8, for a discussion of the concerns that
led to the initial popularity of the Missouri Plan.
111. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 223 (Anchor
Books ed., 1973) (1790).
112. Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme
Courts, 54 J. POL. 427, 427-46 (discussing evidence indicating that elected state su-
preme court justices may be more likely to rule in favor of the death penalty when
facing an upcoming election).
113. When presented with survey results showing that in Texas 83% of the public,
79% of lawyers, and 48% of judges think that campaign contributions affect judicial
decisions, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy said, "This is serious be-
cause the law commands allegiance only if it commands respect. It commands respect
only if the public thinks the judges are neutral." Pete Slover, Lawsuit Challenges
Texas' System of Electing Judges, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 4, 2000, at 21A.
114. E.g., Mary Flood, Justice Still for Sale? Clock Is Ticking on the Answer, WALL
ST. J., June 24, 1998, at T1; Richard Woodbury, Is Texas Justice for Sale?, TIME, Jan.
11, 1988, at 74.
2002]
932 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIX
news program 60 Minutes featured the Texas Supreme Court in a
story titled "Is Justice for Sale?" The program questioned whether
Texas judges were being exposed to undue influence by deep
pocket interests contributing heavily to candidates friendly to their
views. Current Chief Justice Tom Phillips concedes that the story
"had a tremendous impact on Texas judicial politics,""! 5 while his
predecessor, John Hill, has argued that the "news reports only re-
flect a growing belief among many citizens of Texas that [the]
state's legal system no longer dispenses evenhanded justice." '16
Eleven years after 60 Minutes brought Texas' judicial politics to
national attention, Texas was again cast into the national spotlight.
On November 10, 1998, two days before election Tuesday, 60 Min-
utes revisited judicial selection in Texas and concluded that the ju-
dicial politics of 1987 were still pervasive. All that had changed,
according to the story, was the primary source of campaign contri-
butions.11 7 Where trial lawyers had contributed the lion's share of
money to judicial candidates in the 1980s, defense interests had be-
come the primary contributors by 1998. Former Chief Justice John
Hill, who had resigned from the Texas Supreme Court in 1987 to
pursue judicial selection reform, defended the Texas judiciary in
the second 60 Minutes story. He conceded, however, that efforts at
judicial selection reform since the first story were insufficient and
that further reforms were needed. Current Chief Justice Tom Phil-
lips, an advocate of replacing partisan judicial elections with a
merit appointment-type system, also concedes that, although some
reform has occurred, "much more needs to be done. 11 8 In his first
State of the Judiciary Address following the 60 Minutes story, he
renewed his call for judicial selection reform, noting that "[t]he
current judicial selection system has long since outlived its
usefulness. ""'
In the years between 60 Minutes stories, government watchdog
groups began focusing on the electoral politics pervasive in Texas'
judicial races. They most often pointed to the appearance of com-
promised fairness raised by a system that requires judges to cam-
paign with funds donated by interests with cases before the state's
courts. Early efforts focused on the sources of contributions to
115. Id.
116. John L. Hill, Jr., Taking Texas Judges Out of Politics: An Argument for Merit
Selection, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 339, 342 (1988).
117. Hood, supra note 114.
118. Id.
119. Thomas R. Phillips, State of the Judiciary Address, 76th Leg. (1999), http://
www.tomphillips.com/state76.htm.
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Texas Supreme Court candidates,12 ° showing that high court races
in the 1980s and early 1990s tended to pit plaintiff and civil de-
fense-backed candidates against one another. Since then, Texans
for Public Justice has issued two reports probing the link between
the decisions of Texan Supreme Court justices and the donors con-
tributing to their campaigns. 121 The first report to examine the link
between donations and court decisions, Payola Justice, concluded
that
while the faces and ideologies of the justices and their paymas-
ters has changed[,] justices continue to take enormous amounts
of money from litigants who bring cases before the court. The
fact that the parties who finance the justices' campaigns repeat-
edly reappear on the court's docket documents the extent to
which justice is still for sale in the Texas Supreme Court.' 22
In a later report,'23 Texans for Public Justice examined the corre-
lation between donations and the acceptance of cases for review by
the Texas Supreme Court. Although charges of a direct connection
were tempered,124 the report emphasized a higher case acceptance
rate for law firms that contributed heavily to the campaigns of the
high court justices, suggesting that campaign donations at least pro-
vide an entr6e to the court's docket. 125 Chief Justice Tom Phillips
responded, however, that the report failed to prove that campaign
120. TEXANS FOR PUB. JUSTICE, CHECKS AND IMBALANCES: How TEXAS COURT
JUSTICES RAISED $11 MILLION (2000), http://www.tpj.org/reports/checks/toc.html.
121. TEXANS FOR PUB. JUSTICE, supra note 27; TEXANS FOR PUB. JUSTICE, PAY TO
PLAY (2001) [herinafter TEXANS FOR PUB. JUSTICE, PAY TO PLAY], available at http://
www.tpj.org/reports/paytoplay/index.htm.
122. TEXANS FOR PUB. JUSTICE, supra note 27.
123. TEXANS FOR PUB. JUSTICE, PAY TO PLAY, supra note 121.
124. Although the study conceded the difficulties of determining a cause and effect
relationship between campaign donations and judicial decisions, the director of Tex-
ans for Public Justice argued that "[t]he appearance that there is a cause-and-effect is
undeniable. Money seems to get you in the front door." Pete Slover, Group Alleges
Supreme Court Favors Donors, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Apr. 25, 2001, at 23A.
However, see Roy Schotland, Kyle Cheek & Anthony Champagne, Estimating the
Relationship Between Campaign Donations and Judicial Decisions (unpublished man-
uscript, on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal), for a discussion of the method-
ological difficulties associated with attempts to establish a causal relationship between
campaign donations and judicial decisions. Schotland, Cheek, and Champagne con-
clude that it is not only extremely difficult to isolate a causal relationship between
donations and decisions, but that such an approach to the analysis of judicial cam-
paign finance obscures the more important question of how much influence campaign
finance exerts on electoral success in judicial elections.
125. TEXANS FOR PUB. JUSTICE, PAY TO PLAY, supra note 121, found that petitions
for review from large contributors were 7.5 times as likely to be accepted as those
from non-contributors.
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donations had any effect on the acceptance of cases for review,
noting that large donor firms likely handle more cases of the types
the Supreme Court deems worth resolving.126
Perhaps more important than the links between campaign dona-
tions and Texas court decisions is the simple fact that Texas judicial
selection remains at the center of media attention. The first 60
Minutes story, rather than prompting serious reform, seems to only
encourage harsher more constant criticisms of Texas courts. Reluc-
tance to reform judicial elections, combined with the perception of
bias created by the present judicial campaign finance system, in-
creases the likelihood that Texas' process for selecting judges will
remain the focus of attention.
B. Perception of the Courts
The new judicial politics in Texas-replete with scandal, the em-
barrassing election of an unqualified supreme court justice, the ap-
pearance of impropriety raised by large campaign contributions,
and the attention of the national media and interest groups-might
be expected to have eroded public confidence in the courts.
Largely in response to these concerns, Texas' Office of Court Ad-
ministration commissioned a survey of the Texas public as well as
of the Texas legal profession to determine public perception of the
Texas judiciary. 27 The results were generally positive, although
they reveal concern about the fairness of the Texas judicial system.
Over 50% of respondents expressed either a somewhat positive
or very positive overall impression of the Texas judiciary. 28 Sixty-
nine percent of respondents believe that Texas' courts in general
are somewhat or very honest and ethical, 29 while 77% believe the
126. Citing another rationale for the high acceptance rate of large-donor firms,
Chief Justice Phillips said, "Considering the amounts of money they charge, I'd be
surprised if they didn't get good results." Slover, supra note 113, at 28A.
127. SUPREME COURT OF TEX., TEX. OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN. & STATE BAR OF
TEX., PUBLIC TRUST & CONFIDENCE IN THE COURTS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN
TEXAS: SUMMARY REPORT (1998), available at http://www.courts.state.tx.us/public
info. The survey questioned 1215 adult Texans about their impressions of the state's
courts. Several of the survey questions focused on the overall perception of Texas
courts and whether race, gender, or socio-economic status plays any role in the treat-
ment of litigants in court. The survey also asked respondents whether campaign con-
tributions influence court decisions as well as what method of judicial selection most
Texans prefer. The sample size of 1215 adults is sufficient to ensure, with 95% confi-
dence, that the sample results are within 2.8% of the true percentage that would be
determined by surveying the entire population of Texans.
128. Id. at 4.
129. Id. at 5.
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same of the Texas Supreme Court.130 Seventy-three percent of re-
spondents believe that "judges and court personnel are courteous
and respectful to the public.' 13' The same percentage believe that
they would be treated fairly "if they had a case pending in a Texas
court."132
Despite a positive overall impression of the Texas courts, the sur-
vey reveals concern about court fairness in four general areas: gen-
der, race, socio-economic status, and judicial campaign finance.
With respect to gender, only 50% of respondents agreed that men
and women are treated alike in Texas courts, while 62% believed
that there are too few female judges in Texas. Texans expressed
even greater concern about fairness with regard to race. Only 41%
reported that "the courts treat all people alike regardless of race,"
and 55% believe that there are too few minority judges. 33
Texans' greatest concern, however, is the influence of money in
Texas courts: both the effects of socio-economic status on fairness
and court access and the effects of campaign contributions on judi-
cial decisions. Only 21% of Texans agree that "the courts treat
poor and wealthy people alike," while 69% do not believe that
court costs and fees are affordable.134 Texans' concern about the
effects of campaign contributions on judicial decisions is even
greater. When asked whether judges in Texas are influenced by
campaign donations, 83% agreed that campaign contributions in-
fluence judicial decisions. 35
Texans seem generally to hold the state's courts in high regard,
but are dissatisfied with court composition and distrust the role of
money in the judicial process. In spite of Texans' overall belief that
race, gender, socio-economic status and campaign finance are all
problematic issues for Texas' court system, an overwhelming ma-
jority of Texans expressed a desire to retain the current elective
method of judicial selection. 36 This reluctance to embrace whole-
sale reform of the state's judicial selection method strongly sug-
gests that the only realistic way to reform Texas elections is within
the context of the current election system.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 4.
132. Id. at 5.
133. Id. at 6.
134. Id. at 8.
135. Id. at 6.
136. Seventy percent of survey respondents "believed that judges should be elected
by the people" while only 20% preferred gubernatorial appointment with retention
elections. Id. at 8.
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In a survey designed to gauge the legal profession's view of
Texas courts, judges and lawyers expressed moderately consistent
opinions about the courts and judicial selection. Both tend to have
a positive view of the Texas courts,137 but both also reported some
degree of inequity based on race, gender, or socio-economic status.
Fifty-one percent of judges do not believe that Texas courts are
racially biased 138 and 56% did not report gender bias.1 39 However,
only 42% of responding judges reported equal treatment of the
poor and wealthy. 140 Among lawyers, 42% reported the courts to
be free of racial bias' 4' while 37% reported no gender bias. 42
However, only 19% of lawyers feel that the poor and wealthy are
treated equally in Texas' courts.143
The opinions of judges and lawyers tend to diverge with regard
to judicial campaign finance. Judges are nearly evenly split over
the influence of campaign donations on court decisions, with 48%
reporting at least some donation influence. 144 In contrast, nearly
80% of lawyers believe that campaign contributions have at least
some influence on judges. 145 Judges and lawyers tend to agree,
however, in their preferred judicial selection method. Fifty-two
percent of judges and 42% of lawyers indicated a preference for
judicial election, albeit on a nonpartisan basis.'4 6 In contrast, there
was equal, though substantially weaker, support among judges for
partisan elections and gubernatorial appointment systems, each
preferred by only 21% of responding judges. 47 Among attorneys,
gubernatorial appointment with retention elections ranked a close
second as the preferred method of judicial selection at 35%,48
while partisan election was supported by only 11%.149 Both judges
137. Eighty-five percent of judges and 63% of lawyers held either a somewhat or
very high impression of the Texas courts. SUPREME COURT OF TEX., STATE BAR OF
TEX. & TEX. OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., THE COURTS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
IN TEXAS: THE INSIDER'S PERSPECTIVE: A SURVEY OF JUDGES, COURT PERSONNEL,
AND ATTORNEYS 2 (1999), available at http://www.courts.state.tx.us/publicinfo.
138. Id. at 4.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 5.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Judges in local trial courts, minority judges, and rural judges were more likely
to indicate that campaign donations have at least some influence on decisions. Id.
145. Id.
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and attorneys agree that judicial selection ranks as one of the most
important issues facing Texas' court system, with judges ranking
judicial selection as the feature they would most like to change
about the Texas courts. 150 One could conclude that limited reform
efforts would find support, since both judges and Texans seem con-
cerned. Clearly, though, Texans are not ready to give up judicial
elections, and any reforms that occur will have to take place within
the context of a popularly elected judiciary.
VI. TEXAS JUDICIAL POLITICS Now AND ITS LESSONS FOR
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS ELSEWHERE
Since the advent of its new judicial politics, Texas has been a
bellwether for emerging trends in other states with elected judiciar-
ies. In just over two decades, the Texas experience has completed
a full cycle of change. It went from staid, one-party affairs domi-
nated by initial appointment to the bench, to an era of true two-
party competition in judicial contests. Then it moved back in the
direction of one-party dominance. The course of judicial election
politics in Texas has produced valuable lessons for other states.
The most telling lesson from Texas' recent experience with judi-
cial selection is that those interests most affected by court decisions
are willing to exert a great deal of influence to attempt to shape the
composition of state courts. It is at best misguided to argue that
deep pocket interests are attempting to buy decisions from individ-
ual judges. It is, however, equally naive to suggest that those who
stand to lose the most in the courtroom will stand idly by, acquies-
cent to the philosophical makeup of the courts.
In states with elective modes of judicial selection, campaign fi-
nance is the easiest way to influence court composition. As long as
the perception exists that money buys electoral advantage, deep
pocket interests will donate heavily to their favored candidates.
And even in the absence of real competition in a judicial race,
there will be those who will continue to contribute, if for no other
reason than to show their support for one judicial philosophy over
another. On the other hand, as long as judges are elected, they will
feel compelled to accept campaign contributions, even from those
who have interests before their court. For judicial candidates who
face no real competition in an election, a large campaign treasury
may indicate to future challengers that they face a formidable task.
Even in an electoral environment dominated by one political party,
150. Id. at 8.
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a large campaign war chest may serve to stave off primary chal-
lengers. This is true whether those challengers pose a real threat or
are simply viewed as an inconvenience to the incumbent.
Money, though it clouds judicial integrity, is not the fundamental
problem in judicial elections. Money enters judicial politics be-
cause of name-familiarity. Judicial races are typically low-profile
affairs, and candidates for the bench seldom enjoy much name rec-
ognition among voters.1 5 1 To make themselves known, judicial
candidates must spend money. In local trial court elections in
densely populated urban areas, this may still entail garnering rec-
ognition among tens of thousands of potential voters. In statewide
elections, the problem is magnified. Without other effective means
of garnering votes, judicial candidates face little choice but to raise
large amounts in campaign contributions and then to spend money
on name-recognition.
Party affiliation, of course, provides a critical cue for many vot-
ers. 152 Even in the absence of party labels on general election bal-
lots, candidates may enjoy partisan identification from their party's
primary election. 53 When judicial candidates are removed from
nomination via party primary, parties may still prove invaluable to
a candidate's campaign through substantial campaign funding. In
states with real two-party competition, party affiliation may focus
independent voters. 154 In non-partisan races, substantial funding is
even more important, as judicial candidates have no party name on
which to rely. 155 In one-party states, non-partisan elections present
the opportunity for opposing economic interests to wage expensive
campaigns to secure the election of their favored candidates, since
no candidate is guaranteed electoral victory on the basis of party
alone. Expensive judicial races, even if only a symptom of a
deeper problem, are not likely to fade from the judicial landscape
without broad, serious campaign finance reform.
Texas' expensive judicial races exemplify the deep institutional
damage that can result from money's influence. When fierce bat-
151. Champagne & Thielemann, supra note 95, at 271-76.
152. DUBoIS, supra note 2.
153. Kathleen L. Barber, Ohio Judicial Elections: Nonpartisan Premises with Parti-
san Results, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 762, 762-789 (1971).
154. For a discussion of the importance of money in securing the votes of those not
guided by party labels, see Kyle Cheek, The Bench, the Bar and the Political Econ-
omy of Justice: Texas Supreme Court Races, 1980-1994 (1996) (unpublished disserta-
tion in The University of Texas at Dallas Library).
155. California provides a good example. In three 1986 non-partisan, uncontested
retention elections for the Supreme Court, the record amount of $11,400,000 in 1986
dollars was spent. Schotland, supra note 50, at 13 n.55.
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ties are waged between opposing interests to influence court com-
position, the public is likely to stop believing courts are impartial.
Rather, it will likely think that judges are beholden to the interests
that won them election. In extreme cases, the new judicial politics
may result not just in the appearance of impropriety, but in real
judicial misconduct. While episodes like the public discipline of
two Texas Supreme Court justices are infrequent, their existence
only adds to the public sense that the electoral selection system
renders justice to those able to gain influence by contributing to
judges' campaigns.
Because judicial reform invariably impacts some interests ad-
versely, the prospect of meaningful changes in bench ascension is
fraught with formidable problems. In fact, an important lesson
from the Texas experience is that reform is best pursued in incre-
mental steps. Wholesale reform efforts pose major threats to es-
tablished interests, but incremental reform will temper the severity
of that threat, making reform easier to accomplish. Even in the
wake of scandal and national scrutiny of the Texas judiciary in the
late 1980s, wholesale reform efforts were never a serious pros-
pect.156 However, the same circumstances that led to calls for
wholesale reform in Texas were the basis for later incremental
changes in judicial campaign finance.
A final lesson that should be taken from Texas' experience with
judicial selection is that voters can be profoundly committed to se-
lecting their judges in popular elections. Despite criticisms of pop-
ular judicial elections in Texas; national attention on perceived
improprieties; public mistrust of judicial campaign finance; and low
voter knowledge of judicial candidates, Texans still hold fast to vot-
ing for judges. This, coupled with the other difficulties of reform,
makes it unlikely that Texas will abandon its elective process for
selecting judges. It also serves to heighten the importance of incre-
mental reform efforts.
In short, Texas' history of judicial elections vividly illustrates
many of the oft-repeated criticisms of the popular selection of
judges. Perhaps more importantly, Texas' experience with judicial
selection offers important lessons to other states on how to deal
with the difficulties inherent in judicial elections. Certainly, no
other state wants to experience with its courts what Texas did in
the 1980s. However, close attention to the Texas experience pro-
156. Champagne, supra note 36, at 146-59.
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vides, at the very least, an outline for other states to consider as
they find themselves entering the new era of judicial election
politics.
